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© Cambridge University Press, 1993 This article was originally
published in The Journal of Child Psychology and Psychiatry and Allied
Disciplines, Vol. 33, No. 5, pp. 813-842, 1992. It is provided to Asperger
Syndrome Coalition of the United States, Inc. for use on its website
with the express written permission of Cambridge University Press. It
may be downloaded and printed for personal reference, but not otherwise
copied, altered in any way or transmitted to others (unless explicitly
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Abstract:
| Recent autism and autism-related research from Gothenburg
is surveyed. In indigenous families, typical autism seems no more
common now than 10 years ago. Genetic factors play a part in causing
autism and Asperger syndrome. Certain medical syndromes carry a
relatively high risk of concomitant autistic symptoms. Evidence
for nonspecific brain dysfunction is often found in autism and autistic-like
conditions. The search for the underlying clue to the riddle of
autism may be futile. Autism might be best conceptualized as a behavioral
syndrome reflecting underlying brain dysfunction which shades into
other clinical syndromes. A new class of disorders of empathy is
proposed. |
Introduction
|
When in late 1989 Dr. Ann Gath wrote to ask me to present the
Emanuel Miller lecture, I felt honored and immediately agreed
to do so. I was a bit surprised that it was such (relatively)
short notice; May 1 was only a few months away. However, as is
often the case, a typing error had caused confusion. Ann Gath's
letter had led me to believe that I was in for a 1990 ordeal and
I began preparations for the lecture at once. When, a month later,
her next correspondence made it clear that I was not expected
until 1991, I had already made a detailed draft of what I was
going to say in my head. The extra year that I was given in preparing
this paper allowed me to conclude a number of studies which have
shed new light on many of the issues I had planned to discuss.
These studies have also, as always, complicated the overall picture
so much that my first draft has had to be rearranged several times.
I hope that the final product would have met with Dr. Miller's
approval. Unlike some of the previous Emanuel Miller lecturers,
I never met the man behind the lecture. However, from the little
I have read about him I have the general impression that he must
have been a man interested in many different aspects of psychiatry.
This paper draws on several different studies of several different
aspects of autism and (closely or distantly) related conditions.
Therefore, to the extent that I manage to convey a multifaceted,
yet coherent approach to the understanding of an important clinical
problem, I shall have managed, at least in some minor way, to
achieve one of the implicit objects of inviting people to present
papers of this kind.
It is now almost 50 years since Leo Kanner published his first
paper on children with "autistic disturbances of affective contact"
(Kanner, 1943). That paper continues to be one of the most cited
(possibly the most cited) papers in autism literature. It is unusual
for a first paper in a new field to have such a long and active
life. In a preliminary survey of all autism papers published in
this journal, the Journal of Autism and Developmental Disorders
and Developmental Medicine and Child Neurology from mid-1988
through mid-1990, I found a reference to Kanner (1943) in 26 out
of 102 publications (25%).
Why is Kanner's paper so popular? Is it because of its crystal-clear
description of the children? Yes, possibly to some extent, but
other "first authors" have been equally clear without achieving
the same degree of acclaim and interest. Is it because autism
is such a fascinating condition? This can hardly be the case:
the original writings on a number of other fascinating neuropsychiatric
conditions (such as Asperger syndrome, Kleine-Levin syndrome and
elective mutism to mention but a few) have not been cited with
equal emphasis. Or is it because Kanner, in that first paper,
managed to get so close to the true nature of autism that the
progress that has been made after its publication comes down to
very little in comparison?
There is no easy answer to these questions, but there can be
little doubt that Kanner's 1943 paper remains enormously influential
in current thinking in autism.
What if that paper had never been written? Would know-how in
the field be substantially different today? We shall never know.
However, merely by formulating the question, one touches on an
important issue: did Kanner's paper set our minds thinking in
fruitful or fruitless directions? Has it contributed to open-minded
or one-track-mind thinking? Has pluralistic thinking in the field
been damped down or even hindered? Based on some recent examples
of stagnation in thinking about autism I would say that it might
well have done just that. Let me try to spell out why I think
it has and why I have chosen this point of departure for my brief
survey of autism research in our centre and how it related to
that of other groups.
Many authors continue to quote Kanner as defining autism in terms
of a disorder of affective contact. They use this quotation
as an argument for the study of an affective primary deficit
in autism as if the mere fact that Kanner said it was affective
makes it more (indeed much more) likely that an affective
primary deficit will in the end be found. We are constantly reminded
that Kanner said it was affective and that for some reason the
fact that Kanner, in 1943, thought it was affective was
more important than research in intervening years, suggesting
that it may not be affective.
It was this same Kanner, who, in 1960, was quoted by Time
magazine as saying that children with autism were the offspring
of "parents, cold and rational, who just happened to defrost long
enough to produce a child" (Steffenburg & Gillberg, 1989).
It was also Kanner who said that the children were not neurologically
impaired (in the face of evidence to the contrary in his own original
writings). He asserted that they were of potentially superior
intelligence (without citing any evidence for this). He thought
the families were upper class.
All of this assumptions have been questioned or disproven, often
after decades of unproductive word-game debates. And yet, in spite
of the fact that at least 10 population studies (Brask, 1970);
Wing 1980; Anderson and Wadensj–, 1981; Gillberg & Schaumann,
1982; Bohman, Bohman, Bj–rk & Sj–holm, 1983; Steffenburg &
Gillberg, 1986; Cialdella & Mamelle, 1989; L–gdahl, 1989;
Ritvo et al., 1989; Gillberg, Steffenburg & Schaumann,
1991a) have shown normal distribution of social class and only
one has shown a (slight) upper social class bias (Lotter, 1966).
Some authors appear to want to cling to the notion of high
social class in autism.
Research in our centre has shown that children with autism are
not neurologically normal. We have demonstrated over a long period
of time that autism is often associated with specific medical
conditions. Other groups have obtained similar results. On the
basis of these strong associations we have, for many years,
argued for the need of an extensive neuropsychiatric and medical
work-up in all children with autism (Coleman & Gillberg, 1985).
Not many have heeded this recommendation.
Our group has obtained results supporting the forceful evidence
from Lorna Wing's studies that "Kanner autism" is not a discrete
disease entity with one etiology, but rather is one of several
syndromes on a spectrum of autism and autistic-like conditions.
We have not been able to find any support in the literature for
"Kanner autism" being more valid than other variants of the "triad
of social, communication and imagination impairments" (Wing, 1989a)
characteristic of most people with autism and autistic-like conditions.
I have not been able to find a shred of evidence for a clear distinction
between "Kanner autism" and the other variants, including some
cases with so-called Asperger f "Kanner autism" or what they consider
to be "true autism".
Why does this go on? I think it is because the doctors read that
paper! Kanner's writings have dazzled us for so long. His concept
of autism has had overwhelming power, forcing our thinking onto
very narrow paths. Some of Andreas Rett's notions about Rett Syndrome
(Rett, 1966) were wrong and diagnostic criteria and research were
soon modified accordingly. It is high time we did the same with
"Kanner autism", not because of any wish to be derogatory about
the brilliant Leo Kanner, but because some of his autism concepts
were wrong.
|
The Gothenburg studies
|
Several population-based studies from the Gothenburg Department
of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry have bearing on the understanding
of various aspects of autism and autistic-like conditions: (1)
three population screening studies of autism and autistic-like
conditions performed in (a) 1980, (b) 1984 and (c) 1988 in Gothenburg
(a) and in Gothenburg and the rural county of Bohusl”n (b + c)
(Gillberg, 1984; Steffenburg & Gillberg, 1986; Gillberg et
al. 1991a); (2) a population-based twin study of autism in
the Nordic count
Syndrome (Asperger, 1944; Wing, 1981; Gillberg, 1991a). Yet many
groups insist on getting back to the old narrow (allegedly better
defined) syndrome ories performed in 1983-85 (Steffenburg, et
al., 1989); (3) a population-based study of mental retardation
in 1983 (Gillberg, Persson, Grufman & ThemnÈr, 1986); (4)
a population screening study of deficits in attention, motor control
and perception (DAMP) launched in Gothenburg in 1977 (Gillberg,
Rasmussen, Carlstr–m, Svenson & Waldenstr–m, 1982; Gillberg,
1983); and (5) a total population study of anorexia nervosa launched
in Gothenburg in 1985 (RÂstam, Garton & Gillberg, 1989). All
of these studies, except the Nordic twin study, include longitudinal
follow-up, so far for 2-14 years. In addition to these studies,
a number of clinic referral based investigations have also contributed
new knowledge. The possibility of comparing data obtained in clinic
studies with basic information from the population studies has
enabled a better subgrouping of findings into those that are likely
to be representative and those that may reflect referral bias
rather than facts about the condition as such.
The Main Issues to be Discussed
This paper will deal briefly with the following issues in
relation to the above-mentioned studies against a background of
research by other groups: (1) prevalence, (2) etiology, (3) recent
neurochemical and neurophysiological findings, (4) differential
diagnosis, (5) course and outcome, and (6) autism as one clinical
syndrome among a broader group of empathy disorders including
certain treatment/management aspects.
Is Autism Exceedingly Rare?
Kanner thought that autism was rare. Rarity, of course, depends
on how you define it. In the case of autism it is also dependent
on how you define autism. Most authors before 1980 reported "nuclear",
"classic" or "Kanner" autism prevalence figures of 0.7-2.0 per
10,000 children (Lotter, 1966; Treffert, 1970; Brask, 1970; Wing
& Gould, 1979).
Our group in the mid-1980s reported that "infantile autism",
meeting Rutter (1978) and DSM-III (APA, 1980) descriptions, was
encountered in 2.0 per 10,000 children under age 18 years in the
region of Gothenburg, Sweden (Gillberg, 1984). As in all our studies
of "infantile autism", all the children with infantile autism
showed autistic aloneness and an obsessive desire for the preservation
of sameness, the two symptoms thought by Kanner to be necessary
and sufficient for an autism diagnosis (Kanner & Eisenberg,
1956). The study reported a population-based screening performed
at the end of 1980.
Four years later, in 1984, Suzanne Steffenburg and I (Steffenburg
& Gillberg, 1986) reported a new, population-based study of
autism in Gothenburg. The methodology and definitions used were
the same (except that in the new study only children under age
10 years were included) as in the previous study and the research
team was the same. The rate of "infantile autism" was now 4.7
per 10,000.
Three years ago, in 1988, our group again performed a population-based
study (Gillberg et al. 1991a) and the autism prevalence
was 7.8 per 10,000.
Except for the "nuclear" autism cases, there were also a number
of cases with "other psychoses" or "autistic-like conditions".
These possibly correspond to "non-nuclear autism" according to
Lotter (1966) or to "pervasive developmental disorder NOS" according
to the DSM-III-R (APA, 1987). They constituted 1.9, 2.8 and 3.4
per 10,000 respectively in the three population groups. Even though
they too increased in number, their relative contribution to the
whole group of "autism and autistic-like conditions" decreased
steadily. These "autistic-like conditions" were very similar in
symptomatology to those with "infantile autism", but they either
had an onset after age 30 months or had some uncharacteristic
traits such as clinging behavior, exceptional degrees of hyperactivity,
extremely frequent seizures, etc. On the whole, however, similarities
rather than differences prevailed when they were compared with
those who received a diagnosis of "infantile autism". They differed
clearly from the autism group only with regard to sex ratio. The
boy:girl ratio was high in the autism group but almost equal in
the group with autistic-like conditions. One reason for the low
rate of typical autism in females could be the fact that the gestalt
of the autistic syndrome has been invoked from the male prototype
(Kopp & Gillberg, 1991). The same type of condition could
occur in girls, but with a slightly less typical "male" symptomatology.
Given our current diagnostic criteria, these girls would not receive
a diagnosis of classical autism but rather one of "autistic-like
condition", leading to a higher girl:boy ratio in this group.
There was also a tendency for epilepsy to be more common in the
autistic-like group. This could mirror similar diagnostic practices.
Children with very early onset epilepsy, in whom it is impossible
to tease out clearly whether autistic symptoms preceded or ensued
the onset of epilepsy, may be less likely than those without early
onset epilepsy to receive a diagnosis of classical autism.
Over the last 10 years, a number of other researchers have reported
higher rates for autism prevalence (Bohman et al., 1983;
Bryson, Clark & Smith, 1988; Tanoue, Oda, Asano & Kawashima,
1988; Ciadella & Mamelle, 1989, Sugiyama & Abe, 1989;
L–gdahl, 1989). It has been impossible to determine the reason
for this increase. Discrepancies in diagnostic criteria may have
been important, though, since several of the cited studies have
referred to different diagnostic systems. There has recently been
growing concern that the introduction of the "autistic disorder"
concept in the DSM-III-R (APA, 1987) might have inflated autism
prevalence figures. However, this could not account for the high
prevalence in the published epidemiological studies, since they
did not use this diagnosis at all. Nevertheless, gradually looser
autism concepts could have contributed to the steady prevalence
rise.
The Gothenburg studies go some way in offering possible explanations.
Figure 1 shows how the prevalence of autism and autistic-like
conditions in 1980, 1984 and 1988 was distributed according to
IQ and immigrant status of the child's family. The rate of autism
(and the rate of autistic-like conditions) associated with mild
mental retardation has remained at almost exactly the same level
throughout the whole period. Autism associated with immigrant
status, severe mental retardation and near normal or normal intelligence,
on the other hand have all shown an increase. In the case of near
normal/normal intelligence this has been the case in spite of
the fact that the relative contribution of autism associated with
near average/average IQ to the whole group of autism cases has
decreased. The cases Kanner described mostly came in the mildly-moderately
retarded IQ range. Thus, the rate of typical "Kanner autism" in
Gothenburg appears to be stable.
FIGURE 1 GOES HERE~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
There has been a very considerable increase in the number of
cases diagnosed with "infantile autism" among children with severe
mental retardation. This has been interpreted by us as showing
the influence of education on those involved in screening. From
1980 to 1988 autism know-how has increased in Gothenburg. A state-wide
diagnostic centre came into existence in Gothenburg in 1985 following
an intensive period of lectures and spreading of information about
autism in other ways (books, booklets, posters distributed to
hospitals and well-baby clinics, newspaper articles, slide series
and videos). Since 1985, the educative interventions have been
further intensified. The realization that autism can - and does
exist among those with severe mental retardation has led to increased
autism sensitivity among staff and parents involved with severely
mentally retarded children, which, in turn, has resulted in higher
yields in this subgroup of the population in our screening studies.
The greatest increase of autism-severe mental retardation-prevalence
occurred from 1980 to 1984. On the basis of the finding of only
a relatively small increase from 1984 to 1988 a period during
which education about autism increased dramatically in the region
it seems that we may now have "reached the ceiling" with regard
to the severely retarded autism group and that the numbers ascertained
may be close to the true prevalence in the population.
The number of cases of autism with near or normal intelligence
has increased, in spite of the fact that the relative contribution
of this group to the whole autism prevalence has decreased. The
reason for the increase appears to be better awareness in the
general population (including parents and teachers) that normally
intelligent children with autism do exist. The reason for the
decline in relative proportion is the even larger increase in
cases of severe mental retardation and in autism cases in immigrant
families.
In 1980, few immigrants from far-away countries lived in Gothenburg.
In the 1980s, the number of such immigrants increased year by
year. They still contributed relatively little to the total population
of Gothenburg (c. half a million inhabitants), but their childbearing
rate was higher than that of native Swedes. Furthermore, it seems
clear that the rate of autism in their offspring is considerably
higher than in the offspring of parents born in Sweden (Andersson
& Wadensj–, 1981; Gillberg, Steffenburg, B–rjesson & Andersson,
1987a). This high rate has been interpreted as possibly showing
the contribution of environmental factors in utero (such as viral
infections including rubella). As is clearly demonstrated in the
figure, both the absolute and relative number of autism cases
contributed by immigrant parents increased over the 8-year period.
The possibility of a contribution from intrauterine viral infections
was indirectly supported by findings in a recent study from our
group that children with autism in Gothenburg were more likely
to be born in March and that the March-born cases came from poor
social conditions, increasing the risk of pregnancy viral infections
(Gillberg, 1990). The rate of autism among children of immigrant
parents appeared to be high only in those whose parents had arrived
in Sweden from far away countries.
In summary, it appears that the only "type" of autism that has
not increased in prevalence over the last 10-year period is the
nuclear variant described by Kanner. Except for a real increase
contributed by children of immigrant parents, the increase among
the other two subgroups, those with autism with severe mental
retardation and those with relatively high-functioning autism,
is likely to be apparent rather than real and brought about by
better detection in 1984 and 1988 than in 1980. Thus, it seems
that autism is more common than previously believed but not more
common than it used to be 10 years ago, at least in the native
Swedish population.
Asperger syndrome cases have not been included in the prevalence
figures cited. If Asperger syndrome is seen as synonymous or at
least partly overlapping with high-functioning autism, the prevalence
figures constitute an underestimate. Much of the available data,
including some from our own studies of children with DAMP (some
of whom have associated Asperger syndrome), indicates that Asperger
syndrome might be considerably more common than Kanner autism.
A number of other conditions, including other cases of DAMP (other
than those also meeting Asperger criteria), obsessive compulsive
personality disorder, Tourette syndrome and anorexia nervosa also
show all, many or some of the features of autism. If those cases
with such conditions meeting full criteria for autism were included
in autism prevalence figures, the population prevalence would
definitely be higher than presently believed.
Wing's London studies have indicated that the triad of social,
communication and behavioral impairment may be 5-10 times as common
as "nuclear autism" (Wing & Gould, 1979). Our studies of children
with mental retardation in Gothenburg (Gillberg et al. 1986) have
corroborated these findings.
So, in answer to the question whether autism is exceedingly rare
or not, I would say that autism might not be at all that uncommon
and in fact the number affected may be several times that previously
reported in the literature. "Kanner autism" appears to be as rare
as once believed to be. However, this is true only if we limit
our concept of Kanner autism to apply to those who traditionally
are most likely to receive this diagnosis, viz. those with mild
mental retardation. Few researchers seem to realize that thinking
along these lines, although superficially reasonable and straightforward,
may carry a high risk of running into circular augmentation. Our
epidemiological studies, and those of Lorna Wing, suggest that
even if the criteria for autism are kept rather narrow, disorders
similar or identical to those described by Kanner (and by Rutter
and DSM-III descriptions) exist in a considerable number of cases
that would not have been thought of as Kanner autism just because
they happen to come in a different costume different with respect
to IQ, sex, personality and other features. These matters will
be further discussed in the section on differential diagnosis.
Are Children with Autism Neurologically Intact?
One of the few studies before 1985 which did not appear to be
heavily influenced by the tradition pursued ever since Kanner's
first paper was published by Lorna Wing and Judith Gould in 1979.
These authors studied social impairment among a population of
handicapped children under age 15 years in southeast London. They
found that severe social impairment tended to cluster with communication
impairment and restrictions in the behavioral repertoire. This
"triad" of social, communication and behavioral impairment tended
to co-occur in some children regardless of whether the clinical
gestalt of Kanner autism could be invoked or not. Furthermore,
they found that clear or indirect evidence of neurological dysfunction
was very common in the whole of the socially impaired group, both
in those classified as Kanner autism and those with other clinical
syndromes comprising the triad.
Long before Lorna Wing, the literature was full of direct or
indirect evidence of brain dysfunction and neurological impairment
in subgroups of children with autism (e.g. Ritvo et al.,
1970; Rutter, 1970). The fact is that even some of Kanner's first
11 patients showed hard evidence of neurological dysfunction (Kanner,
1943; Kanner, 1971). Very briefly, it has been clear for several
decades that there are quite a number of children with classical
Kanner autism who are not neurologically intact.
The Gothenburg studies have demonstrated that some kind of neurological/neurophysiological
impairment is the rule rather than the exception in autism. Some
of the main findings from these studies were recently reviewed
in Steffenburg (1990). At the present stage, with regard to etiology,
one can discern at least four broad groups in autism: (1) familial
autism, (2) autism associated with specific medical condition,
(3) autism with unspecific signs of brain dysfunction without
family history of diagnosed medical condition, (4) autism without
any clear evidence of autism family history or brain dysfunction.
In one of the Gothenburg population studies, Steffenburg (1991)
found 8.5% in group (1), 37% in Group (2), 46% in group (3) and
8.5% in group (4). In an even more recent study in which the three
population groups were pooled together with a large number of
referral cases, Gillberg and Gillberg (personal communication)
found almost identical proportions belonging to the four groups
(Fig. 2).
That autism might have genetic roots has been suspected with
varying degree of emphasis ever since 1943. However, it is only
in the last decade that hereditary factors in autism have come
to be regarded as possibly important. The evolution in this respect
has run parallel with the landslide developments in the field
of new genetics. However, already in 1977, Michael Rutter's team
(Folstein & Rutter, 1977), presented evidence from the first
systematic twin study
FIGURE 2 GOES HERE~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
|
(*)
Medical syndrome:
|
| Moebius syndrome |
Laurence-Moon-Biedl syndrome |
| Fragile X syndrome |
Rett syndrome |
| Other chromosomal syndrome |
Congenital hydrocephalus |
| TS |
Williams syndrome |
| NF |
MCA/MR syndrome |
of autism that some kind of hereditary cognitive factor associated
with autism played an important role in the development of some
cases of autism. The fact that the sibling rate of autism in families
in which one child had been given a diagnosis of autism was (and
remains) much higher than in the general population also supported
a genetic basis for some autism cases. Our own population-based
twin study of autism showed very high concordance rates in monozygotic
pairs, but no concordance in the dizygotic pairs (Steffenburg
et al., 1989) (Figs.3 and 4). The monozygotic-dizygotic
difference remained after exclusion of fragile X positive twins.
Our data could be interpreted as showing an autism-associated
hereditary factor in some cases of autism, but there was no strong
evidence that this factor was cognitive rather than social or
social cognitive. Bolton and Rutter (1990) recently concluded
that there is a "significant familial loading for specific cognitive
disorders" (particularly of speech, language and reading). They
based this on a survey of six studies of siblings of children
with autism. Only two of these studies made use of a comparison
group of (Down syndrome) siblings of children without autism.
The matter is in need of further investigation, but the evidence
can hardly be regarded as conclusive. In our own studies (Steffenburg,
1991), we looked at the rate of learning disorder (mental retardation
or disorders of speech, language or reading requiring remedial
measures) in mothers, fathers and siblings of children with autism
and similarly aged comparison cases with and without deficits
in attention, motor control or perception who had been drawn from
the general population of children and found no clear evidence
of differences. However, the rate of Asperger syndrome in mothers,
fathers and siblings appeared to be increased, even though numbers
were too small for differences across groups to reach statistical
significance. Altogether 9% of children with auti sm had a father
with Asperger syndrome or Asperger traits. In 6% of the autism
cases this was the only clue as to pathogenic mechanisms. Major
problems pertain to studies of this kind, such as varying sex
ratios among proband and sibling groups, the choice of autism
"control" group (normal, Down syndrome, DAMP or other handicap),
the developmental course of the disorders studied and hence the
problems associated with ascertainment at different ages, diagnostic
criteria varying from one study to another, and the methods used
for identifying cases.
FIGURE 3 & 4 GOES HERE~~~~~~~~~~
My contention is that there is considerable support for the existence
of a hereditary subgroup in autism, but that data about the nature
of the genetic predisposition and about how much of the autism
variance that can be explained by genetic factors are just not
sufficient to suggest plausible answers. Based on our own studies,
the "purely genetic" subgroup could encompass anything from 6%
to 63% of the whole autism group.
Perhaps the most surprising finding for some is the relatively
high number of cases with an identifiable medical condition. Table
1 reviews most of the medical conditions that have been reported
to be associated with autism by ourselves or other groups.
Table 1. Associated medical conditions in autism documented
in at least two studies
| Medical condition |
Important reference |
|
Fragile X syndrome
Other sex chromosome anomalies
Marker chromosome syndrome
Other chromosome anomalies
Tuberous sclerosis
Neurofibromatosis
Hypomelanosis of Ito
Goldenhar syndrome
Rett syndrome
Moebius syndrome
PKU
Lactic acidosis
Hypothyroidism
Rubella embryopathy
Herpes encephalitis
CMV infection
Duchenne muscular dystrophy
Williams syndrome
|
Hagerman, 1989
Hagerman, 1989
Gillberg et al., 1991b
Hagerman, 1989
Hunt & Dennis, 1987
Gillberg & Forsell, 1984
‰kefeldt & Gillberg, 1991
Landgren, Gillberg & Str–mland, 1991
Coleman & Gillberg, 1985
Ornitz, Guthrie & Farley, 1977
Friedman, 1969
Coleman & Blass, 1985
Gillberg et al., 1992
Chess, Korn & Fernandez, 1971
Gillberg, 1986
Stubbs, 1978
Komoto, Udsui, Otsuki & Terao, 1984
Reiss, Feinstein, Rosenbaum,
Borengasser-Caruso & Goldsmith, 1985
|
Some authors have reported considerably lower frequencies of
associated medical conditions in autism than we have. This, as
usual, will lead some critics to speculate that the Gothenburg
material might be uncharacteristic in terms of the autism diagnosis
at the symptom level and that other experienced authors would
not have diagnosed autism in some of these cases. A recent blind
inter-rater study from our centre based on case records judged
independently by myself and Professor Michael Bohman (Steffenburg
et al., 1989) suggests that this would be an unlikely explanation.
If a full neurobiological work-up, including CAT-scan, EEG, chromosomal
culture, auditory brainstem examination, ophthalmological, audiological
and otological examinations as well as CSF-analysis had not been
performed, only about 18% of the whole group (as compared with
37%) would have been shown to have a medical condition. This figure
accords better with those of other authors. I therefore propose
that the high rate of associated medical conditions in the Gothenburg
material can be attributed to the comprehensiveness of the work-up
rather than any particular bias in the material as such. However,
regional differences might account for some of the variability.
For instance, it appears that the fragile X syndrome might be
considerably more common in western Sweden than in other regions
(Wahlstr–m, 1991, personal communication). Since the fragile X
syndrome sometimes underlies autism this would lead to an increased
rate of autism associated with known medical conditions. In our
material we have found a relatively high rate of autism associated
with neurocutaneous disorders (altogether 8% of all children and
adolescents receiving a diagnosis of autism in our centre had
tuberous sclerosis, neurofibromatosis, or hypomelanosis of Ito
(AhlsÈn, 1991; Gillberg & Forsell, 1984; ‰kefeldt & Gillberg,
1991). At least half of these cases would not have been diagnosed
in connection with the diagno sis of autism had not the neurobiological
work-up been exhaustive. Again, this underscores the need for
a comprehensive medical and laboratory examination of all children
who receive a diagnosis of autism. I have presented detailed evidence
in favour of this view elsewhere (Gillberg, 1991b), and refer
those interested to that publication. Here, I think it suffices
to summarize the essential work-up of children with autism in
a table (Table 2). Unfortunately, there are still those who maintain
that this is a much too "ambitious" work-up, referring variously
to the expensiveness of the investigations, the low yield, and
the impossibility of performing many of the examinations in children
with severe behavior problems. In respect of the expensiveness,
the lifetime cost for the family and society in cases of autism
is such that the cost for the medically and psychologically important
work-up is negligible. Furthermore, why should the work-up of
a lifelong handicap such as autism not be allowed to be as expensive
as that of other severe handicaps, such as epilepsy and severe
mental retardation? That the yield of a comprehensive work-up
in autism is reasonable should not be a matter of dispute regardless
of whether 12% - as recently reported by Ritvo et al. (1990)
or 37% - as in our studies have associated medical conditions.
That the behavioral problems exhibited by the child should be
a major obstacle is clearly refuted by the fact that in our centre
almost all cases with autism undergo a full medical work-up without
major problems. However, admittedly, there can be problems for
the laboratory staff to cope with the odd behaviors shown by children
with autism. This is best dealt with by organizing the work-up
in ways which will allow the same doctor or technician to manage
all (or most) cases with autism, rather than having a whole host
of different people manage only the occasional case. Also, in
connection with general anesthesia which is often necessary in
young children undergoing CAT-scan or MRI-examinations regardless
of diagnosis it is often possible to perform several other examinations
such as fundoscopy, blood sampling, etc.
Table 2. Relevant laboratory analyses
in all medium/low-functioning, and certain high-functioning, cases
with autism and autistic-like conditions
|
Analysis
|
Finding
|
Reference
|
| Chromosomal |
Fragile X q27.3 |
Hagerman, 1989 |
| (including in a folic-acid-depleted
medium) |
XYY |
Gillberg, Winnerg”rd
& Wahlstr–m, 1984 |
| Deletions, e.g. 15p |
Kerbeshian, Burd, Randall,
Martsolf & Jalal, 1990 |
| |
Marker chromosome |
Gillberg et al., 1991 |
| |
Other |
Hagerman, 1989 |
| |
|
|
| CAT-Scan/MRI-Scan |
Tuberous sclerosis |
Gillberg, Steffenburg
& Jakobsson, 1987b |
| |
Intrauterine infections |
Chess et al., 1971 |
| |
Neurofibromatosis |
Gillberg & Forsell,
1984 |
| |
Hypomelanosis of Ito |
‰kefeldt & Gillberg,
1991 |
| |
Other |
Tsai, 1989 |
| |
|
|
| CSF-protein* |
Progressive encephalopathy |
Wing & Gould, 1979 |
| |
|
|
| EEG |
Tuberous sclerosis |
Steffenburg, 1990 |
| |
Subclinical epilepsy |
Gillberg & Schaumann,
1983 |
| |
Epileptogenic discharge |
Gillberg & Schaumann,
1983 |
| |
Other |
|
| |
|
|
| Auditory Brainstem |
Brainstem dysfunction |
Coleman & Gillberg,
1985 |
| |
|
|
| Response Examination |
|
|
| |
|
|
| Ophthalmologist |
Poor vision, fundus |
Steffenburg, 1990 |
| |
|
|
| Oto-laryngologist |
Poor hearing, anatomy |
Smith, Miller, Stewart,
Walter & McConnell, 1988 |
| (including hearing test) |
|
|
| |
|
|
| Blood |
|
|
| phenylalanine |
high |
Friedman, 1969 |
| uric acid |
high |
Coleman & Gillberg,
1985 |
| lactic acid |
high |
Coleman & Blass,
1985 |
| pyruvic acid |
high |
Coleman & Gillberg,
1985 |
| herpes titer |
seroconversion |
Gillberg, 1986 |
| |
|
|
| 24-hour urine |
|
|
| metabolic screen, |
|
|
| including muco-polysaccharidosis |
|
Coleman & Gillberg,
1985 |
| uric acid |
high |
Coleman & Gillberg,
1985 |
| calcium |
low |
Coleman, 1989 |
Lumbar puncture for CSF-analysis is a safe and relatively non-traumatic
procedure. In the Scandinavian countries, it is always considered
in the work-up of young children with severe developmental disorders.
If there is a nearby laboratory doing CSF-amino acids (phenylalanine
in particular), CSF-monoamines and CSF-endorphins, these tests
should be considered since the chlid has to have a lumbar puncture
anyway (to exclude progressive encephalitis/encephalopathy).
FIGURE 5 & 6 GOES HERE ~~~~~~~~~~
The "non-specific brain-dysfunctional group" with autism remains
the largest in our studies, even though the rates of clearly familial
and medical syndrome autism have increased steadily over the last
15 years. This group comprises cases with epilepsy, CAT-scan abnormalities
without a known cause, and major abnormalities on EEG-, ABR- (auditory
brainstem response), CSF- and fundus examinations. The demonstration
of abnormal brain function on such examinations can sometimes
be helpful in planning specific treatments (such as in the case
of subclinical epilepsy). It is usually very helpful from the
psychological point of view in helping families come to terms
with the fact that their child is handicapped. The association
of autism with even unspecific brain dysfunction makes the handicapping
condition less mysterious in the eyes of most laymen (Figs. 5
and 6). There is sometimes a tendency among "experts" to disregard
this aspect of the medical work-up. Even though no clear cause
can be found, the mere fact that one can demonstrate any relationship
at all between autism and brain dysfunction tends to make the
autistic symptoms more "acceptable".
Epilepsy in autism is very common, affecting 30-40% of all cases
before c. 30 years of age (Olsson, Steffenburg & Gillberg,
1988; Volkmar & Nelson, 1990). Conversely, even though no
systematic study has been published specifically examining autism
symptoms in epilepsy, it appears that autistic-type behavior is
very common in epilepsy. There seem to be at least two peaks for
age of onset of seizures in autism, one in early childhood and
another in the teenage period. The old notion of a single peak
(in adolescence) may have been produced by old diagnostic practice
based on Kanner's statements about neurological intactness in
autism. Even though diagnostic criteria did not include this,
it is quite possible that in older studies, children with early
onset epilepsy and autism were withdrawn on the dubious basis
of an implicit diagnosis hierarchy in which autism appeared at
the bottom (after exclusion of all other indications of brain
problems or sensory deficits). In such a hierarchy, early onset
epilepsy would be a sign of brain dysfunction and a diagnosis
of autism would not be considered. Adolescent onset epilepsy,
it seemed, could not invalidate a diagnosis of typical Kanner
autism which might have been made 10 years ago. Nevertheless,
the opaque logic of diagnosing autism only in the absence of signs
of brain dysfunction stands out as unreasonable in the light of
this kind of confused practice in the field of autism and epilepsy.
In the Gothenburg studies, complex partial seizures were very
common in autism (Olsson et al., 1988; Gillberg, 1991c).
It is well known that such seizures often signal underlying temporal
lobe dysfunction. It is quite surprising the way the connection
between autism and epilepsy, documented from Kanner's early writings
on autism, has attracted extremely limited scientific attention.
Many studies of autism are still launched on the notion that
the underlying cause of autism will be found. Claims are
often made that in scientific study autism must be "pure" in order
for the cause to be revealed. "Pure" autism is then, often
rather muddle-headedly, thought of as autism without mental retardation,
autism without a known medical condition, autism without neurological
dysfunction, etc. Does anybody believe that there is one cause
for "pure" epilepsy? I do not think so. In discussing the boundaries
of autism (see below) it will become even more apparent that the
search for the clue to the riddle of autism is likely to be futile.
This is certainly not to say that in research it may not be fruitful
to subdivide the autism group on the basis of some reasonable
method, such as IQ, sex, known familial loading or associated
medical condition. All it implies is that there is no good scientific
reason for saying that one subgroup is purer than another.
Are there Neurochemical or Neurophysiological Abnormalities
in Autism?
I am not going to review here the extensive literature on neurochemical
and neurophysiological studies of autism. The interested reader
is referred to a recent excellent overview of autism neurochemistry
by Cooke (1990) and to a forthcoming review of autism neurophysiology
and neuroanatomy by Gillberg and Coleman. I shall instead discuss
briefly some of our own recent findings, some of which are in
press and others which are in the process of being written up.
I shall do this against the background of some of the relatively
well established findings and hypotheses concerning neurochemistry,
neurophysiology and neuroanatomy in autism.
Serotonin in the blood is raised in 25-35% of patients with autism,
but it is not yet clear whether the association is with low IQ
only or whether it is more "specific" to autism. In our own studies,
5-HIAA (the metabolite of serotonin) in the CSF has been significantly
raised only in "non-nuclear" autism cases and only in the subgroup
with moderate or severe mental retardation.
Abnormalities of dopamine metabolism have been invoked in urine
and CSF-studies of autism. In our own studies of CSF-monoamines,
HVA has been consistently higher than in normal comparison cases
and cases with non-autistic mental retardation. One study from
our centre has suggested that the CSF-ratio of homovanillic acid
to hydroxymethoxyphenylglycol might be increased in autism (Gillberg
& Svennerholm, 1987).
Endorphin hyperfunction has been suggested by results from a
few groups, including our own (e.g. Gillberg, Terenius & L–nnerholm,
1985). In a more recent study, beta-endorphins tended to be low
in the CSF of children with autism and Rett syndrome as compared
with various comparison groups, most of whom were of adult age
(Gillberg, Terenius, Hagberg, Witt-Engerstr–m & Eriksson,
1990a). There were no age trends within the autism or Rett groups.
In another new study from our centre (Fig. 7), an astroglial
cell protein, the so-called GFA (Glial Fibrillary Acidic) protein
in the CSF was raised 3 times above the level in a normal age-matched
group (AhlsÈn et al., 1992). Speculatively, this abnormality,
if upheld by further research, could implicate increased turnover
of glial cells, such as could occur in gliosis, which, in turn,
might implicate unspecific brain damage (Aurell, 1989; Crols,
Saerens, Noppe & Lowenthal, 1986). Another possible interpretation
would be increased synapse turnover resulting from primary regulatory
abnormalities or from unspecific damage to the brain. Synapses
are rich in astroglial material and high GFA protein levels would
result from synapse breakdown regardless of underlying cause.
Similar high levels of CSF GFA protein have been reported in epilepsy
(Hamberger et al., 1991). Also, the GFA protein content
of adenoma sebaceum tissue in tuberous sclerosis tissue has been
reported to be high.
FIGURE 7 GOES HERE~~~~~~~~~~
Auditory
brainstem response examinations in autism have often yielded abnormal
results, but contradictory evidence also exists. CAT-scan abnormalities
are relatively common but possibly unspecific. Recent interesting
findings using CAT- or MRI-techniques have suggested brainstem,
cortical developmental and cerebellar abnormalities in autism.
Abnormalities of the Purkinje cell fibres have also been demonstrated.
In the largest-scale study of auditory brainstem responses to
date in autism, we have again found that about one third of all
cases with infantile autism have either a prolongation of the
brainstem transmission time, a pathological increase of internaural
time difference or a pathological response variability, or combinations
of these (Rosenhall, AhlsÈn & Gillberg, 1991). Children with
these pathological findings are likely to have clear neurophysiological
or neurostructural abnormalities at the brainstem level. Clinically
they are slightly to moderately hypotonic, show extremes of odd
sound reactions, often dislike music and have relatively poor
language comprehension skills.
In a study of 27 high-functioning
cases with autism, single positron emission computed tomography
technique (SPECT) revealed hypoperfusion of the temporal lobes
(Gillberg, Gillberg, Bjure & Uvebrandt, 1991). Many of the
cases in this study had epilepsy. Normal comparison groups without
any suspicion of neurological/psychiatric disorder have not been
examined. For these reasons, the conclusions must be guarded.
Nevertheless, there was the same type and degree of hypoperfusion
in the autism cases with and without epilepsy, indicating that
epilepsy per se would be unlikely to account for the findings.
There is no distinctive
trend or pattern of overlap in these "neurostudies" that we have
been able to find at the present stage. Nevertheless, all the
findings are compatible with an overall model for the development
of autistic symptoms of dysfunction in brainstem/cerebellar/vestibular
areas, temporal lobes and prefrontal structures. The biochemical
abnormalities that have been documented might well reflect abnormal
neural activity in these areas. Dysfunction in the areas mentioned
could result in symptoms of autism, and, depending on exactly
which of these areas mentioned were dysfunctional and on whether
any additional area was involved, other symptoms also (mental
retardation, epilepsy, hypotonia, etc.). Some of the findings
(for instance those concerning endorphin abnormalities) have inspired
specific therapeutic trials, the results of which are not yet
available.
Is Autism a Highly Specific,
Easy-to-Diagnose Condition?
Most authors now agree that autism as a distinct disease entity
does not exist (Andersson et al., 1989). The reasons for
this conclusion are too many to list here, but some of the most
important are (1) the fact that a number of different medical
conditions can cause a behavioral syndrome which is indistinguishable
from "Kanner autism" (Steffenburg, 1991), (2) the finding that
children with and without demonstrated neurological signs do not
differ in respect of autistic symptom profile (Garreau, Barthelemy,
Sauvage, Leddet & Lord, 1984) and (3) the observation that
"Kanner autism" overlaps both at the pathogenetic and symptomatic
levels with a number of other conditions showing the triad of
social, communication and behavior impairments (Wing, 1989a,b).
Even with a diagnosis of
classic autism and hence a core syndrome as described by Kanner,
symptoms, behaviors and personality traits can vary considerably.
Autism cases with the fragile X syndrome are behaviorally different
than, for instance, most autism cases with Rett syndrome (Gillberg,
1991b). Once the underlying etiology is disclosed, differentiating
features at the behavioral level can be discerned. Without knowing
the etiology, the "extra-autism" symptomatology that may be typical
of a particular medical condition cannot be extracted.
Rett syndrome has provided
a striking illustration of the confusion which arises if researchers
continue to insist on the purity of the autistic syndrome. One
study from our centre revealed that of all Rett syndrome cases,
80% had first been given a diagnosis of pure autism (half of the
cases) or autistic-like conditions, by doctors other than ourselves
(Witt-Engerstr–m & Gillberg, 1987). Also, we have published
a number of case histories meeting criteria for infantile autism,
autistic disorder or autistic features on the one hand, and all
or almost all of the criteria for Rett syndrome on the other.
How should they be diagnosed? I have no difficulty in saying that
if they meet criteria for both disorders, they should be diagnosed
as autism and Rett syndrome. Other authors have, for reasons unclear
to me, argued differently that if Rett syndrome is present this
should be the only diagnosis regardless of whether criteria for
autism are met or not. If a child has epilepsy and the medical
work-up reveals an underlying brain tumor, it would not be appropriate
to say that the child has a brain tumor and not epilepsy.
Autism was first described
in children of some years of age. The current diagnostic criteria,
to a considerable extent, are based on the clinical picture of
autism as presented in 3-6 year old children (boys in particular).
Autism before age 3 years may have a different symptom profile.
In a recent study in our centre of 28 children referred before
age 3 years with a preliminary diagnosis of autism or ""childhood
psychosis" (Gillberg et al., 1990b), 20 (possibly 21) were
found to meet the criteria for autistic disorder after age 3 years.
This means that even at a specialized centre, the number of false-positives
identified in infancy is considerable. Some turn out to have mental
retardation without autistic features and others to have more
benign attention disorders. Nevertheless, the majority of cases
referred in infancy turn out to be true positive cases after several
years' follow-up.
In the case of autism associated
with other medical syndromes I can see no problem in making multiple
diagnoses. The scientific community seems to agree that autism,
mental retardation, and epilepsy can all be diagnosed in one and
the same patient. It should be equally easy to agree that autism
can also be diagnosed in conjunction with the fragile X syndrome,
Rett syndrome, hypothyroidism, etc.
Several authors have commented
on the overlap between autism and Asperger syndrome (e.g. Frith,
1991). Some children first receive a diagnosis of autism but are
later thought better to fit the Asperger syndrome stereotype (Wing,
1989a, b). Autism and Asperger syndrome sometimes occur within
the same family (Bowman, 1988; Gillberg, 1989; Steffenburg, 1991;
Gillberg, 1991a).
A number of reports in
the literature on the co-occurrence of Asperger and Tourette syndrome
have implied the possibility of some kind of a connection between
these syndromes. There are also occasional mentions of families
with autism and Tourette in different individuals as well as of
Tourette and autism coexisting in the same patient (Comings &
Comings, 1991).
Asperger syndrome is currently
most often conceptualized as a variant of high-functioning autism,
but there is no complete consensus in the field. The observations
that expressive language at the formal level is usually better
developed in Asperger syndrome and that motor skills are relatively
better in autism have led to speculation that they may not exist
on a continuum of "autistic conditions".
Asperger syndrome shows
considerable overlap with semantic-pragmatic disorder (Bishop,
1989). Semantic and pragmatic problems are also common in children
with deficits in attention, motor control and perception (so called
DAMP (Gillberg 1983)).
Children with DAMP quite
often show "triad" symptoms and some have marked autistic-type
symptoms. In reanalyzing the data from one of our population studies
of DAMP, an important minority of severely affected children were
shown to fulfil research criteria for Asperger syndrome both at
age 7, 10 and 13 years (Gillberg & Gillberg, 1989). Thus,
quite often children with severe DAMP (constituting 1.2% of all
seven-year olds according to Gillberg et al., 1982) exhibit
social impairments, semantic pragmatic problems and restricted-stereotyped-repetitive-obsessive
behavior patterns of a milder variant, but of the same type as
those encountered in autism (Gillberg, 1983) (Fig. 8). More than
half of the children with DAMP have been observed to have speech
and language delay already at age 4 years (Rasmussen, Gillberg,
Waldenstr–m & Svenson, 1983). Some of the children with DAMP
(about one third according to our studies) also meet the criteria
for generalized or pervasive hyperkinesis (Gillberg & Gillberg,
1988) and may be presented clinically as suffering from "the hyperkinetic
syndrome". The hyperkinetic children may or may not show autistic
features. Many of them develop severe dyslexia. Overall, there
are no clear boundaries between autism, Asperger syndrome, semantic-pragmatic
disorders and DAMP (often with dyslexia).
FIGURE 8 GOES HERE~~~~~~~~~~~~
In 1985, we reported the
concurrence of autism and anorexia nervosa in certain families
(Gillberg, 1985). Since then, scattered reports about such a connection
have appeared in the literature. There is at least one reported
case of anorexia nervosa in autism (Stiver & Dobbins, 1980).
Comings and Comings (1991) have described an extended family with
different individuals affected by Tourette syndrome, obsessive-compulsive
disorder, autism and anorexia nervosa.
RÂstam (1990) (see also
RÂstam & Gillberg, 1991) in our centre, performed a mixed
population-based and clinic referral study of anorexia nervosa.
The population-based part of the study is clearly the most comprehensive
prevalence study of anorexia nervosa ever performed. Every child
in a population of c. 4,300 was physically examined and a number
of other screening measures were included. It was shown that under
age 18 years, the anorexia prevalence in girls was 1.1% and in
boys 0.1%. In the "mixed" study of 51 anorexia cases and 51 sex-,
age- and school-matched cases, 1 of the 3 boys with anorexia had
Asperger syndrome and 3 of the 48 girls had autistic-like conditions.
Tourette syndrome, tics and obsessive-compulsive personality disorders
(all diagnosed on the basis of de-identified case records by a
blinded experienced clinician) were extremely common in the anorexia
nervosa and very rare in the comparison groups (Fig. 9). The DSM-III-R
diagnostic criteria for obsessive-compulsive personality disorder
(not for obsessive-compulsive disorder) in several instances overlap
with those of autistic disorder. An interesting, originally unexpected
find in the study of anorexia nervosa was that, as compared with
the age-, sex- and school-matched group, the teenagers with anorexia
showed dysdiadochokinesis, a finding often reported in DAMP (Gillberg,
Gillberg & Groth, 1989) and commonly encountered in Asperger
syndrome also. Dysdiadochokinesis in regarded as one important
neurological sign of cerebellar dysfunction. Cerebellar dysfunction
has been reported in several studies of autism in recent years
(Ritvo et al., 1986; Courchesne, Yeung-Courchesne, Press,
Hesslink & Jernigan, 1988).
FIGURE 9 GOES HERE~~~~~~~~~~~~
In summary, it seems that
severe and typical nuclear Kanner autism may be relatively easy
to diagnose (even though at meticulous work-up even this group
will be shown to consist of at least the four subgroups described
in Fig. 2), but that the boundaries are far from clear in respect
of "other triad conditions", autistic-like conditions, so-called
pervasive developmental disorders, Asperger syndrome, and severe
DAMP. Even conditions hitherto not considered in relation to autism,
such as anorexia nervosa, obsessive-compulsive personality disorder,
and Tourette syndrome, may show some (even considerable) overlap
with autism (Fig 10, see below).
|
Course and Outcome
Autism associated with severe mental retardation
diagnosed already before age 5 years carries a gloomy prognosis in respect
of psychosocial adaptation. Also, a recent review from our centre (Gillberg,
1991c) indicated that mortality is likely to be increased in this group.
Of Leo Kanner's first 11 cases, 1 died before age 30 years. Even though
there is no direct proof yet, increased mortality might well be associated
with severe underlying medical problems such as tuberous sclerosis.
Autism associated with mild mental retardation or
near average intelligence levels has a much more variable prognosis.
Unfortunately, even in this group, about half do poorly psychosocially
in adult age and do not hold jobs or lead independent lives in other
ways. However, a proportion of cases in this group has a relatively
favorable prognosis and will be able to be self-supporting as adults.
Only a few percent are likely ever to be married or to engage in marriage-like
relationships.
In the very high functioning group of cases with
autism or Asperger syndrome, the overall prognosis is much better. Oddities
of social style, communication and interests are likely to remain, but
the majority from this group hold down jobs and it seems that a large
proportion get married and have children. Systematic prospective long-term
follow-up studies of these cases so far have only been published in
connection with reports on the whole of the "classic autism" group,
which means that only 15-30% were relatively high functioning. Therefore
there is much less detail with regard to the outcome picture in the
high-functioning group than in the groups with concomitant mental retardation.
Wing (1983) has suggested that the overall clinical
picture in autism changes across time and that by adult age, three broad
groups can be identified. One remains "autistic". Another group is passive
and friendly and will exhibit insistence on sameness and other typical
autism symptoms only under stress. The third group is best described
as active but odd. Our own studies, both those which have included long-term
follow-up of population cases of autism diagnosed in childhood, and
the cross-sectional studies of adolescents and adults in a mental handicap
hostel have provided considerable support for Wing's subgrouping.
Rutter (1970) was one of the first to suggest that
pubertal deterioration might occur in a sizable minority of children
with autism. He did this on the basis of results obtained in a clinic
referral group of autism and autistic-like conditions. Our group, on
the basis of population screening studies of autism found a high rate
of symptom aggravation in adolescence. A full 22% of the whole group
of children followed through age 16-23 years showed clear signs of deteriorating
in adolescence (Gillberg & Schaumann, 1981; Gillberg & Steffenburg,
1987). Follow-up at age 23-30 years, currently in progress, reveals
that most cases taking a deteriorating course in adolescence never return
to preadolescent levels of language, communication and social functioning.
Children with autistic-like conditions have a very
variable prognosis, ranging from very poor psychosocial outcome in the
small subgroup with so-called childhood disintegrative disorders to
fair or even good in the much larger subgroup with DAMP, normal intelligence
and autistic features.
Prognosis in the whole field of autistic syndromes
can be more precise if we subgroup according to other known correlates
in each individual case. For instance, a child with severe autism, severe
mental retardation and severe epilepsy, all with onset before age 2
years, is likely to have a generally very poor psychosocial outcome.
Tuberous sclerosis is a quite common cause for such a constellation
of symptoms. If tuberous sclerosis constitutes the main underlying etiologic
factor, then other specific problems associated with that diagnosis
can be predicted with varying degree of precision. If, on the other
hand, a boy of three with autism, normal nonverbal intelligence and
echolalia, and has a well-functioning father with an Asperger type personality
(implying a form of familial autism in the boy), outcome is likely to
be relatively good.
Is Autism a Subclass Among a Broader Group of Empathy
Disorders?
An underlying theme in this paper has been the
notion of autism as a behavioral syndrome with no precise boundaries.
Recent attempts at pinpointing the intrapsychic mechanisms underlying
the clinical problems encountered in autism have led to the development
of a new psychological theoretical framework for autism and autistic-like
conditions (Frith, 1989; Frith, 1991). It has been proposed that young
children with autism may lack a theory of mind, i.e. they do not
understand that other people think or feel or, in other words, they lack
the capacity to attribute mental states to other people. As they grow
older, the better-functioning appear to develop the capacity to make first-order
belief attributions ("I think she thinks .."), but still have great problems
with second or higher-order belief attributions ("I think she thinks he
thinks .." etc.). Normal 4-year olds have a theory of mind which operates
at least at the first-order belief attribution level and 7-year olds are
able to make second-order belief attributions. According to Baron-Cohen
(1990), no subject with autism under age 11 years has shown signs even
of first-order theory of mind skills. Those children with autism who pass
first-order tasks have a mental age above 4 years (and usually above 6
years) according to Baron-Cohen.
This is not the place to extensively review the
theory of mind theory. Suffice it to say that this type of thinking
about autism has opened a new window on the whole field, both clinically
and theoretically. Parents and other caregivers agree that here is a
psychological theory that not only explains so many of the behaviors
shown by children with autism, but is also able to predict their behavior,
social interaction and communication in a given setting. The theory
of mind theory is neutral in respect of affect in autism. It does not
predict that affects are primarily dysfunctional in autism, nor does
it predict that affect does not become dysfunctional in autism.
It has been my clinical experience over the years
that children with autism are sensitive to affective change, that they
can "feel" (unreflectingly) if an interaction is full of strong emotion
(even if not shown "on the outside"), that they themselves can be happy,
fearful, glad, and angry, but that they cannot make sense of the feelings
of self or others. In this sense, it seems clear to me that autism
cannot be primarily a basic disturbance of emotions. However, people
with autism have problems, usually throughout life, when it comes to
putting emotions into a cognitive perspective. Compassion can be said
to be a cognitive effect and people with autism have problems in this
field.
I think it makes sense to regard the compassion
deficits encountered in autism as a secondary consequence of the theory
of mind deficit. If you do not understand that other people have,
as it were, inner worlds, how can you be expected to show compassion
or sympathy.
Empathy could be defined as the ability to conceptualize
other people's inner worlds and to reflect on their thoughts and feelings.
Good empathy skills, of course, require a well-developed theory of mind.
In fact, one way of looking at it is as having a theory of mind being
synonymous with having empathy. Empathy and sympathy would not be synonymous,
however. Most people know that some people have good empathy skills
and yet do not demonstrate a shred of sympathy. Psychiatrists can be
empathic without being sympathetic. Some psychopaths, almost by definition,
have good empathy skills or, if you will, an excellent theory of other
people's minds and yet show very little, or indeed no, sympathy. In
order to be able to deceive other people one of the fields in which
psychopaths excel you must have good empathy skills/a well-developed
theory of mind. People with autism, on the other hand, have enormous
difficulty in deceiving other people. Except when it comes to getting
their way in the field of obsessional interests, this holds for people
with Asperger syndrome also.
In the foregoing, I have made a case for the overlap
of autism and Asperger with other clinical syndromes. Could it be that
obsessive-compulsive personality disorders, some cases of anorexia nervosa
and Tourette syndrome, and perhaps also those with paranoid disorder
share a common problem with autism and Asperger syndrome in that they
all have moderate to severe problems in the field of empathy? Is their
development of a theory of mind delayed and/or deviant? Is autism perhaps
the most severe form of empathy disorder? Is anorexia nervosa in girls
in some cases the equivalent of Asperger syndrome in boys? Have we relied
so much on the male prototype for autism that we have failed to understand
that the extreme obsessiveness, limited capacity for social interaction
and generally rather poor psychosocial prognosis (Herzog, Keller &
Lavori, 1988) in girls with anorexia nervosa could signal a close relationship
between the two at the psychological (and perhaps biological) level?
Could so-called "alexithymia" (the inability to speak about feelings),
said to be characteristic of anorexia nervosa, be a sign of theory of
mind problems reflecting not just the inability to communicate about
feelings but about mental states generally? The clinical leads (Bruch,
1977; RÂstam, 1990) in the field of anorexia nervosa are admittedly
limited, but, I think, sufficient to warrant testing of this hypothesis.
One way of exploring a possible relationship would be taking detailed
developmental histories with a particular view to finding autism-associated
symptoms in a series of anorexia cases and controls. We are now planning
to do this by having a research assistant blind to group status interview
the mothers of all cases and controls in the RÂstam (1990) study, using
parts of the HBS (Handicaps, Behaviors and Skills; Wing & Gould,
1978). We also intend to subject cases and controls to higher-order
theory of mind tasks to test the hypothesis that there may be associated
empathy defi cits in certain cases of anorexia nervosa.
Taking the issue of overlap further, obsessive-compulsive
personality disorder is typical of many cases of anorexia nervosa and
of Tourette syndrome and share some important clinical features with
Asperger syndrome and autism. Some people with Asperger syndrome grow
up to develop paranoid tendencies. Obsessive-compulsive personality
disorders, Tourette syndrome and paranoid disorders could also be further
explored with regard to a possible autism relationship by studies similar
to those suggested for anorexia nervosa.
Figure 10 aims to illustrate overlap of clinical
syndromes in the field. The inserted square comprises the majority of
the empathy disorders according to the model discussed. This overlap
model could, by some, be taken to indicate an extension of the concept
of autism to take in just about everything. Such concern is quite legitimate.
However, my purpose is not to impossibly widen the bounds of Kanner's
specific variant of autism, but rather to examine the various clinical
manifestations of impairments of social interaction. Many, perhaps most,
conditions in psychiatry are on a continuum, just like many physical
disorders (hypertension, diabetes, etc.). A proper aim of research is
to explore the boundaries as well as to try to find sub-groups that
have some cohesion within the continuum.
FIGURE 10 GOES HERE!~~~~~~~~~~~
One way of looking at possible underlying mechanisms
for the development of empathy disorders is illustrated in Fig. 11.
Falling in the lowermost portion of the normal distribution with respect
to empathy skills, having a more specific genetic trait for poor empathy
skills, or sustaining damage to brain areas involved in subserving empathy
functions might all result in a similar clinical picture. This line
of reasoning would be very similar to that generally accepted when trying
to conceptualize background mechanisms in mental retardation.
FIGURE 11 GOES HERE~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~`
Concluding Remarks
Can a concept of autism and other disorders of empathy such as that
presented in this paper be of any use? I think it can, and in a number
of different ways. First of all, it is possible to test out within the
various clinical syndrome populations whether they, as contrasted with
other groups, show specific theory of mind/empathy deficits. Second,
knowledge about autism might help in the study of obsessive-compulsive
personality disorder and anorexia nervosa and vice versa. Third, finding
new boundaries within this conceptual framework might well lead to the
establishment of more useful clinical diagnostic criteria across these
groups. Finally, but by no means least, understanding more about the
underlying empathy deficit has already contributed to the clinical management
of people with autism. It does not seem unlikely that, if a disorder
of empathy is also present in some cases of anorexia nervosa, the management
of these patients in everyday practice will have to change considerably
paying attention to the handicapping nature of the underlying disorder
and not only to the rather more "superficial" eating disorder.
In summary, unlike those who "insist on Kanner autism",
I think that we would do well to take a more balanced view and pursue
some of the lines of research which present themselves if autism is
viewed as a subclass of empathy disorders. Instead of putting all the
money on the splitter approach, I suggest that lumping may again prove
useful as a first step in the process of subgrouping on a more rational
basis than that of "pure Kanner autism".
Acknowledgements
I am very grateful to Uta Frith and Lorna Wing for valuable comments
on the first draft of this paper. I am also indebted to Maria RÂstam
and I. Carina Gillberg for taking an active part in discussions which
have led to the formulation of some of the issues raised at the end
of the paper.
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